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Abstract 
This research study is focused on exploring the trends and correlations that exist in the immigration patterns among various 
societies in the world and especially in the European cultures. The migration period contributed significantly to the beginning of 
the medieval and modern Europe in the Mediterranean world, hitherto dominated by the Roman Empire and by the vestiges of 
other, more ancient cultures. The rise and fall of the Roman Empire can be well depicted by the changes in population, which is 
not known exactly but could be estimated with reasonable precision. Present Europe faces a similar crisis caused by a great tide 
of migration across the world, including Europe. This article will further analyze the historical, recent population and migration 
databases on the clusters of immigration patterns to see if there is any meaningful analogy in the two phenomena separated by 
about two millennia. Our first question is whether can these movements be attributed to purely physical, especially economic 
factors and population forces or do they have to do with the mental and psychical states of the dominant societies of the time. The 
next question is whether there are any recognizable patterns in history, in the dynamics of society. By recognizing patterns we 
hope to stimulate discussion on the multidisciplinary approach to history, cultural typology, and semi-quantitative diachronic 
study of social phenomena. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate briefly the phenomena of migration in the Mediterranean in two historical settings 
two millennia apart. First we briefly investigate available population data then we try to find meaningful analogies 
between the data using Arnold Toynbee’s scheme [1] and related models to be discussed later for the development of 
individual civilizations and societies and finally we address the question of possible regularities in history. Toynbee 
has tried to describe and partly explain the fates of individual civilizations in terms of the “challenge and response” 
model. According to this model, civilizations in their growing period successfully solve problems which are first 
usually physical in nature, but later become rather spiritual and societal thus generating awe and inspiration in the 
societies around them. Two chapters of Ref [1] are devoted to the breakdown and disintegration of civilizations 
which are due to loss of command over the physical and/or human environment, giving rise to a series of 
disadvantageous social and political phenomena: the hitherto leading “creative” minorities become “dominant” ones, 
the diffuse borders between the civilization; which is transformed into a universal state, and its neighborhood 
become closed, rigid and defensive. The internal proletariat becomes alienated, while the external proletariat attacks 
the universal state. In the early phase of the universal state the administration and the army were well organized and 
can resist the pressure, but later it loses territory and finally collapses. In the late period the immigrants can become 
the emperors themselves. This model is highly relevant for us as both the Roman Empire in its late period and the 
present European Union can be well described as “Universal states” exposed to external pressure from immigrants. 
Nowadays, especially in “postmodern” circles such models are not too popular. Many would reduce the 
description and explanation of migration to a combination of population dynamics, fertility, mortality, production 
and transport abilities. This is essentially the basis of the approach of e.g. Elvin [2] and Scheidel [3] in their research, 
when trying to compare the history of the Roman and Chinese Empires, the two largest “universal states” of the 
ancient period in a comparative manner, using population, economic and archaeological data. Turchin [4], a scientist 
working on the borderline of biology and social sciences also deals a lot with the general and concrete questions of 
economic and population dynamics of pre-modern societies. 
2. The population patterns in the Roman Empire and in its neighborhood 
Although not known exactly, there are reasonably good estimates for the population of the Roman Empire 
throughout its history. We will rely here on the data collected by Maddison [5] which is relatively well structured in 
terms of time and region. Table 1 shows the total estimated population of the Roman Empire according to [5] for a 
nearly 1000 year period, per region. 
 
Table 1.Changes in the population of various major regions in the Roman Empire 
between 300 BC and AD 600. [5] 
 Population ( million ) 
Time period 300 BC  200 BC AD 1  AD 200  AD 400  AD 600 
Europe total 17.2 19.0 22.8 25.6 20.7 15.4 
Italy  4.5 5.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 3.5 
Iberia 3.9 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.0 4.0 
Gallia 3.8 4.4 5.8 7.5 5.8 4.5 
Greece 2.8 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.8 
Danubian countries 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.6 
Asia total 7.0 7.8 9.3 10.0 8.4 7.1 
Asia Minor 4.5 5.0 6.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 
Syria 2.3 2.6 3.0 2.8 2.2 1.9 
Cyprus 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Africa total 5.8 6.5 8.2 9.5 7.9 6.8 
Egypt 3.5 4.0 4.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 
Cyrene 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Maghreb 2.0 2.2 3.8 4.0 3.6 3.6 
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2.1. Patterns recognition 
The tendency is clear: the total population increases until about AD 200, afterwards decreases to the level before 
the onset of growth, sometimes to even lower figures. It can be observed that the peak was reached earlier in Italy, 
the central area of the Empire, although the decline after AD 200 is also conspicuous. In Gallia the population 
maximum was achieved around AD 200, while Greece exhibited decline almost in the whole investigated period. 
The population change in Asia Minor was of decisive importance within Asia, where the population peak also 
appeared around AD 200. The African region also shows fairly similar pattern where Egypt, similarly to Italy, Gallia 
and Asia Minor goes through a maximum around AD 200. It should be noted that (after Italy) the richest regions in 
the early imperial period were Egypt, Asia Minor, Greece and those parts of the Maghreb area which were close to 
Egypt, so their population reflected more closely the boom and bust periods of the whole Empire. An analysis [6] of 
the archaeological data between 300 BC and AD 400 also clearly shows the existence of an economic-demographic 
“golden age” around the beginning of the Christian era.  
Although several good monographs are available on the history of ancient Asian peoples and empires 
demographic data of similar quality as in the case of the Roman Empire were not found, only some less detailed 
estimates [7]. Table 2 based on the data [7] shows the estimated population of the continents with some sub-division 
for Asia, where China and India are treated separately between 400 BC and AD 1000. If comparing with Table 1 it 
has been noted that the time-scale is somewhat different and that in Table 1 the Roman Empire is considered, with 
some parts belonging in Table 2 to Asia and Africa. 
 
Table 2. Estimated changes in the population outside Europe between 400 BC and AD 1000 [7]. 
 Population (million ) 
Date 400 BC 200 BC 0 AD 200 AD 400 AD 600 AD 800 AD 1000 
China 27 42 51 60.8 51.3 46 50.6 61.0 
India 24 31.5 35.7 41.8 47.5 52 63.8 79.5 
Other Asia 21 34.5 30.6 28.5 32.3 48 39.6 45.0 
Europe 18 27 30.6 36.1 32.3 26 28.6 37.1 
Africa 7 10.5 17 17.1 19 20 28.6 31.8 
Other 3 4.5 5.1 5.7 7.6 8 8.8 10.6 
Total 100 150 170 190 190 200 220 265 
 
Nevertheless this much can be said even from this brief outline: 
 
x Asia was the main repository of humanity throughout the period spanning 400BC to 1000AD 
x China similarly to the Roman Empire has gone through a maximum around AD 200 the second Han period 
x India exhibited an inverse curve with a minimum around the beginning of the Christian Era 
x Other Asia exhibits the minimum just around the peak time of the Roman Empire and China – which may well be 
partly due to the migration itself 
x Europe which includes only a part of the Roman Empire shows decline after AD 200  
x Africa exhibits growth almost throughout the whole period. 
2.2. Immigration analysis  
It is known that Europe on the Western Side of the Ural Mountain and Central Asia had a considerable 
population surplus [8]. According to our present understanding several tribes and peoples of the Migration Period 
roughly between AD 300 and 700 as Germans, Goths, Saxons, Huns, Vandals etc. came from this area [9]. The 
events leading to the population maximum in the Roman Empire around AD 200 are manifold and are probably 
inter-related. Turchin in his studies [10] finds a direct correlation between the increasing population and the degree 
of social unrest, which may result in civil wars and a decrease of population. Ashraf and Galor [11] tried to set up a 
much more complicated mathematical model on the relations between cultural diversity, assimilation and economic-
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social results. In their opinion relative geographic protection helps the assimilation of immigrants, resulting in a 
certain degree of uniformity which supports the accumulation of material wealth. Too strong isolation, however, 
blocks the acceptance of foreign ideas, technologies, innovations; which may be a drawback in the long run. The fall 
of the Roman Empire has been analyzed by many including Gibbon [12], Spengler [13]and Toynbee [1]. In addition 
to material factors all three authors emphasized strongly psychological-spiritual factors which prevented the 
effective resistance to the “barbarian” invasion. The idea of the republican Rome eroded fast, fertility dwindled, and 
the ebb of birth could not be reversed even by the alimentary system allotting land and pension for war orphans. 
Childlessness is a curse of all aging civilizations where individual convenience and advantages are pursued. Lower 
population means less tax, weaker army which must be diluted by mercenaries or foreigners. 
3. Immigration to Europe  
According to a prediction of the Population Reference Bureau 2008 [14] the proportion of the population from 
the developed countries will continuously decrease in the world population until 2050. Figure 1 was compiled using 
the estimates on the expected populations in various regions between 2004 and 2050. From the comparison of the 
data, it turns out that the only region where decreasing population is forecasted is Europe. The next one is China 
with its 10% expected growth, which may be a consequence of drastic birth control. All other regions with the 
exception of Africa, where 100% increase is expected, exhibit 40-50% growth. It should be noted that the majority 
of the growth potential in the North American region is also due to migration, which increases the “non-WASP” 
(White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant) proportion of the society. This study deals, however, first of all with the 
Mediterranean region and its neighborhood. It is well known that how changes of population depend on mortality 
and age distribution [15]: in preindustrial societies a higher, but fluctuating birthrate is balanced by a high mortality 
rate and after a major economic development the decrease of mortality rate is only slowly followed by a decreasing 
birth rate, resulting in a transient population increase which usually stabilizes at a higher level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.Expected population changes between 2004 and 2050 based on the estimates of the Population Reference Bureau [14] 
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Fig. 2.Distribution of immigrants to the “old” Europe (former EU-15) per countries of origin according to a statistics from 2004 [17] 
Presently Europe has to face the problems of an aging society, while fast growing regions elsewhere in the world 
have to face another problem: to give work and income to the younger generation not content with the living 
standards of their predecessors. According to an UN survey “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision” [16] 
in the first half of the 21st century the main sending regions are Asia, Latin America and Africa, while the main 
receivers are Europe and North America. Of course these data do not contain data on migration within the global 
regions, which is significant. 
If one looks at the distribution of the European migrants per countries of origin [17, 18] in figure 2 we can see 
that among the countries sending emigrants to the “old” Europe more than 50% belong to other European countries 
like west, south, central and eastern Europe. From the non-European regions of Africa and the near East represents 
much higher proportion than Asia, especially if we consider Turkey due to its dominant Islamic religion as a part of 
the near- East. This is understandable as the migration of the population of low income Asian countries is directed 
more at richer Asian countries, America or the petrol based economies of the Near East (Kuwait, Emirates etc.). 
This tendency is reinforced by the progressive aging of the Japanese and not much later of the Chinese societies. 
Europe has to face first of all immigration form Africa and from the Arabic countries.  
3.1. Immigration data clusters 
If one looks at the world map showing the proportion of young generations [19] in 2005 and 2025 (estimated) we 
will see that the North-African countries will move from the “hot” stage that is (i.e.), proportion of 30- generation > 
60% to the “warm” stage i.e., 30- generation between 45-59 %, while form the sub-Saharan African countries only 
the south African Republic and Botswana will get to this category. Meanwhile a considerable part of Europe (Spain, 
Italy, Greece from the Mediterranean and practically whole Eastern and Central Europe from Germany to Ukraine) 
will get from the “lukewarm” position i.e., proportion of 30- generation between 30-44 % to the “cold” one i.e., 
proportion of 30- generation < 30 %. It can be thus expected that the “emission tendency” of the sub-Saharan 
African countries will last longer than that of the North-African Arabic countries, while the decreasing population in 
certain South and Central European countries will make immigration necessary. Table 3 is compiled from data 
dealing with the migration in the Near East [20] showing when the proportion of the 20-25 years generation will 
reach its maximum value. The same study warns us that the emigration tendencies from these countries will be 
further reinforced by desertification caused by climatic change. 
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Table 3. Time of expected peak of the 20-25 years generation in various North African and Near Eastern countries (Source: UNPD,World Population 
Prospects”). 
Year Rather emigrant source Rather receiving immigrants 
2005 Morocco  
2010 Algeria, Iran, Tunisia  
2015 Lebanon Bahrain 
2020 Jordan, Turkey  
2025 Egypt  
>2030 Iraq, Mauritania, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Yemen Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
 
If we want to compare the expected immigration to the present Mediterranean from countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa to that from Arabic (North-African) countries, we can again rely on the estimation of the UN [21] (see Figure 
3). It can be seen that as serious sources of migration one can mention North-Africa and Western Africa. It can be 
assumed that from these regions more will target Europe. Desertification plays at least as important role in the Sub-
Saharan migration as in the North African one [22]. East Africans move, as a rule towards the North, while Central 
Africans and West Africans towards the Western bank, perhaps from there to the North, but some venture even 
crossing the Sahara. From the Atlantic shore they go further to the Canary Islands, from Morocco to Spain, from 
Libya and Tunisia to Sicily, to the Italian mainland or to other Mediterranean islands.  
4. Discussion and analysis 
From the above study and research review, deductions of the future European generations in the form of graph 
are as:- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Expected migration trends from various African regions. [21]. 
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Migration to the EU by itself is almost unavoidable or could be prevented only by such a degree of deformation 
of the social-political system which could easily result in the end of the EU itself and would produce problems 
which are comparable in severity to those caused by migration. The rigor suggested instead of multiculturalism may 
be a temporary solution but if we look at the history of the Roman Empire we may venture to say that the success 
will be transient. Force requires army and for this also more children are needed, not only for tax payment. Anyway 
the “missing generation” which has not been born, can be hardly replaced fast by political decisions. It is a big 
question whether the fatigue of the European culture can be simply reversed by simple resolution, as this is not the 
result, rather the cause of the phenomena leading to large scale migration. Toynbee who has been referred to already 
in the beginning of this study [1] had something to say about this too. In his opinion neither archaism (looking back 
to the past to reconstruct and copy it) nor futurism (a quantum leap to the future) gives a solution. The solution 
comes if exceptional individuals or creative minorities withdraw from the everyday life of their environment to 
solve the problems.  
According to the historical experience learning form history is possible for the individual but is a very rare 
phenomenon at the societal level – if exists at all. Many would reject with indignation even the attempt to look for 
historical analogies as described above, for various reasons. Some say that we look for such processes, analogies, 
patterns in history in vain as everything is individual and the goal of historical science is to reconstruct these 
individualities. Anyway we do see remarkable similarities between some phenomena in the late Roman Empire and 
our contemporary Atlantic/European history, from which migration is only one. These consequences are long term 
ones – the decline of the Roman Empire also lasted centuries. It does not mean that the individual has no choice and 
responsibility but that certain illusions should be given up and perhaps it is worth to convince others about the 
futility of these illusions. This activity is not without danger as people do not like if their illusions are destroyed, 
they may react aggressively. This aggression can be well detected in the rising nationalism and right wing 
movements of contemporary Europe, but this escapism does not slow down, rather hastens the conclusion, which is 
not necessarily liked by us. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study we have analyzed the immigration trends in the world as a whole and in Europe as specific. We 
have also identified patterns and clutters among the data. Analysis further focused on looking for patterns and 
analogies that they assume non-existent, personal or impersonal forces which influence historical events from 
behind; although these events are the results of individual decisions with unpredictable outcomes, so the future is not 
deterministic, but free. We do not assume, however, a kind determinism which excludes the possibility of individual 
decisions, but look for regularities or patterns of social phenomena have their own dynamics which can be 
recognized and described allowing a certain degree of predictability. Such regularities are looked for by sociologists, 
social psychologists, cultural anthropologists; therefore there is no reason to exclude such a research as a legitimate 
goal from historical studies. 
The mainstream of historical thinking, Toynbee [1] and Spengler already mentioned before there were others, 
such as Sorokin [20], Quigleyand several others who sought for recognizable patterns in history. Some of these 
patterns seem to be cyclic in nature but Szmodis, drawing on the much earlier ideas of Maine [21]. Many others 
developed further the cultural cycle theory of Spengler and distinguished two kinds of societies: stagnant and 
progressive ones, of which only the second exhibits cyclic development and at the end of their history a kind of self-
destruction. It should be noted that this is not a value judgment, rather a characteristic of the societies and their 
world-view. The European historical thought, always was tempted to see not only a linear development but also a 
kind of fulfillment, where after there is no qualitative change, only a gradual improvement. This was inherent in 
Hegel’s work [23] but re-appeared also in some recent works; as evident from the famous book of Fukuyama [24] 
the “end of history”.  
Few are the most important conclusions of this research study: 
 
x Immigration due to certain demographic and economic tendencies is not only unavoidable, but to a certain 
degree is also necessary. 
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x A considerable portion of the immigrants come from cultures alien to the Europeans, and this proportion is 
expected to increase in the future. 
 
The migrants usually stick to their original cultural identity which leads first to the formation of enclaves, later to 
segregation and finally to ghetto formation – especially if the later descendants of the first generation migrants can 
climb up neither in the labor market nor on the social ladder. 
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